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The Pacific Grove Fire Department of Pacific Grove, California, planned and
conducted a drill to anticipate and train for a multi-casualty incident (MCI). The city has an
active disaster preparedness program which includes not only professional emergency
response services, but community officials and volunteers. It had recently been recognized
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as one of 38 communities nationwide with
exceptional emergency preparedness programs 1 . The MCI drill described in this report is
one of the periodically conducted drills within the overall context of disaster preparedness
for the city. It was conducted for training and to improve emergency response procedures.
Pacific Grove is a small seacoast community on the Monterey Peninsula, between
the City of Monterey and Pebble Beach, 120 miles south of San Francisco and 335 miles
north of Los Angeles. It encompasses an area of 2.86 square miles; has a population of
17,400, an annual rainfall of 18.5", average temperature of 56.5° F, and employs 125 full
time city employees. The Pacific Grove Fire Department responds to an average of 1300
calls a year. Approximately 56 % of these calls are medical responses. The Department is
made up of both paid and volunteer firefighters. There are 15 paid firefighters and 35
volunteer firefighters, 30 volunteer Ocean Rescue team members, a Fire Chief, Assistant
Fire Chief and Division Chief/ Fire Marshal, Administrative Secretary, Disaster
Coordinator (PT), and a Fire Clerk (PT).
The Pacific Grove MCI drill of 22 November afforded an opportunity to observe
and understand the local emergency response system.
The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis (IJWA) at the Naval Postgraduate School
does research on topics which encompass the concerns of National Defense. Since the end
of the Cold War, National Defense has begun to focus upon a more diverse collection of
topics including prevention of and response to acts of domestic and international terrorism.
There is an increased awareness of the potential for the use of radiological, chemical and
biological means, generically referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Their
common characteristic is that these weapons posses lethality which is indiscriminate in their
target selection and which can cause many civilian casualties.
The civilian community faces many incidents with multiple victims for which the
response requires the cooperative efforts of more than a single response unit. These are
classified as Multi-Casualty Incidents (MCI). Any response imposed specifically for chem-
bio terrorism must be within the context of the civil emergency response mechanism of
local authorities in order for the response to be credible and effective. The local civil
emergency response system must be able to prepare for earthquakes, fires, hazardous
material spills, riots, industrial accidents, criminal activities, airplane and multi-car highway
crashes, etc. The police, fire and public works departments of local cities must cope with
these disasters initially. It may be hours or even days before state and federal assistance




Consequently, a first requirement in preparing for terrorism is to understand the
local civil emergency response system of ordinary cities. In a series of LTWA reports, we
plan to document civil emergency response scenarios, with the ultimate goal of
incorporating chem-bio terrorism response within the existing system. We are developing
a model of emergency response and making real-time measurements of response and
reaction times in drill exercises.
The information we obtain has a variety of uses beyond our goal of modeling chem-
bio terrorism response. The model can be used for multi-casualty response to study the
effects of a variety of response scenario changes. It is time-consuming, personnel
intensive and expensive to conduct real drills and not all contingencies can be practiced.
With the model under development, we can simulate the effects of a variety of plausible
contingencies. For example, the effects of traffic jams could be accommodated by
changing the travel times of fire engines and ambulances in the computer simulation. The
availability or unavailability of different units could be considered by changing the kinds
and numbers of ambulances or equipment, e.g. jaws of life, decontamination capabilities,
etc.
In this first report, we document the Pacific Grove Fire Department's MCI drill of
22 November 1997 and present an initial analysis of sequence of events. In the second
report, we will present model parameters using the data obtained during this drill. The
intended value of this first report is the documentation of the event and the extraction of
immediate lessons learned. Unedited feedback commentary are presented so that this report
may be useful to the reader to understand the different perspectives among the various
participants.
II. THE MULTI-CASUALTY INCIDENT DRILL
This report concerns the Saturday, 22 November 1997 Multi-Casualty Incident Drill
conducted by the Pacific Grove Fire Department. This report emphasizes the data collection
to support understanding of the local response mechanism. To support the exercise goal of
improving emergency response, lessons learned and recommendations are presented.
The MCI scenario was a traffic accident in which a passenger vehicle collided with
and overturned a van and a large school bus on Ocean View Blvd. at Asilomar, Pacific
Grove California. The bus driver and the driver of the passenger vehicle were under the
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influence of alcohol making the incident a crime scene. Approximately sixty victims were
involved, including fifteen fatalities. Some ten fire response vehicles, five ambulances and
a medical evacuation helicopter responded to the scene in addition to a variety of Pacific
Grove police sedans, a California Highway Patrol motorcycle, three Red Cross Emergency
Response Vehicles, a Salvation Army canteen van and two local television station vans.
Doc's Garage in Salinas contributed towing capability to turn over and upright vehicles
involved in the accident. The County Emergency Medical Service and other planning
agencies provided observers to this drill. All in all, about 1 70 players participated in the
event.
Besides the Pacific Grove Fire, Police and Public Works Departments, units from
Monterey Airport Fire Department, Seaside Fire Department, Monterey Fire Department,
,
California Highway Patrol, Carmel Fire Department, Carmel Mid-Valley Fire Department,
Salinas Fire Department and Salinas Rural Fire Departments responded. Medical Response
was provided by the American Medical Response (AMR) ambulances, one ambulance
from Carmel Regional Ambulance Service and a medical helicopter from CALSTAR.
Hospital support was provided by Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (CHOMP),
Natividad Medical Center and Watsonville Hospital. The County Communications/ 91
1
office was fully integrated in this drill. The County Sheriffs office provided two coroners.
Some 60 victims were provided by volunteers from the Monterey Peninsula Community
College nursing program and students from the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Support
services were provided by the Monterey Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Carmel-
by-the Sea Red Cross Chapter, the Santa Cruz Red Cross Chapter and the Salvation Army.
Data taking was conducted by volunteer airmen from the DLI.
In addition, the McDonald's Restaurant on Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, provided
egg McMuffins at 0630 for the volunteers before the drill.
The incident drill officially began at 0900 and lasted until about 1 130.
III. CHRONOLOGY
III.l Preparation
The MCI Drill was conceived by Assistant Chief Andrew Miller, Pacific Grove Fire
Department, sometime in August 1997. Appendix 1 presents the Exercise Plan prepared
for the MCI drill. A series of planning meetings were held on October 15 , November 4
and November 22 at the PG Fire Station. (Appendix 2 ). The Pacific Grove Fire
Department made logistic preparations for moulage of victims and coordination.
Representatives of the Naval Postgraduate School were invited to observe the exercise.
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Naval Postgraduate School representatives visited some of the other participants to
receive briefings from the County Communications/ 91 1, CHOMP, Monterey County
Emergency Medical Service, AMR and Salinas Valley Medical Hospital. In anticipation of
a this MCI drill, NPS also attended an after action critique in Soledad of an actual
multicasualty hazardous material incident after a purported ammonia leak.
111.2 Pre-Drill Orientation
On the day of the drill, victims and data collectors assembled at about 0600 at the
Pacific Grove Fire Department. The data collectors were given a conference room in the
Pacific Grove Police Department. The data collectors were airmen, mosdy E2, assigned to
the U.S. Air Force 311 Training Squadron at the Defense Language Institute. Because
they had been selected specifically for language training, their academic capabilities and
initiative were high, characteristic especially important since this was the Naval
Postgraduate School's first experience with participation in an MCI drill and individual
initiative was needed when unanticipated events occurred. Among the data collectors, the
level of background ranged from those who did not know what an emergency drill was to
those who had been volunteer firefighters in their home town.
The data collection packets were designed so that each data collector would shadow
a key player in the MCI drill according to the MCI organization chart (see Appendix 4).
A short orientation was provided to the volunteer data collectors describing our
general goals and data collection methodology. The nature of an MCI and logistics of the




The PG Public Works Department had barricaded Ocean View Blvd. prior to 0730
so that vehicular traffic was detoured around a five block long area. Ocean View
Boulevard at that site was bounded on the inland side by the Pacific Grove Golf Course
and on the other side by Monterey Bay, so the site location insured minimal inconvenience
to the general public. The only citizen complaint received was from a local resident of
noise generated by the medical evacuation helicopter.
During the period from 0730 to 0830, a large school bus, van and sedan were
towed to the site. The bus and van were flipped on their side and the passenger sedan was
parked adjacent to the bus. The vehicles had had their windows removed and the
automotive fluids drained prior to the incident so that an actual hazmat spill was not a
consideration for this exercise.
4.
At 0830 carpools and vans took the moulaged victims and data collectors from the
Pacific Grove Fire Department to the drill site.
At 0906 the passenger vehicle was put ablaze and the incident drill began. Victims
acted realistically with hysteria and screaming. The area had not been cordoned off, so
golfers and pedestrian traffic was not impeded. Three Pacific Grove High School long
distance runners were somewhat taken aback, but a burning car and screaming victims did
not seem to affect the golfers' game too much.
Within 3 minutes of notification, the Pacific Grove police department arrived. The
fire department appeared and extinguished the flames in the burning car by 0924.
III.4 The Event
Appendix 3 presents a chronology of events as recorded by various data collectors
shadowing key participants in the drill. The clock time readings for County
Communications, our data collectors, CALSTAR and AMR were in general, but not exact,
agreement. Data collectors had synchronized their watches prior to departing the staging
area, but there was no synchronization of times with other organizations. The log presents
the activities of various functions during the drill in one minute increments from 0900 to
1130.
It is important to notice that in many instances, even though individual supervisors
for various functions had not been formally assigned, the functions were carried out by
other participants.
Furthermore, there are instances in which ambiguity exists in the times recorded
For example, our data collectors at the site recorded the first ambulance leaving the scene at
0959 and the arrival at CHOMP was reported to be 1002. This may be due to lack of
synchronization of clocks. In this report, we do not attempt an in-depth analysis, but
simply present the recorded data.
The general sequence of events are given below.
0905 call in incident
0907 MCI alert from County Comm
0910 police arrive





09 1 3 move minor injured to side




move first injured out of back of bus
0921 Transportation Group established - establish communication with base hospital
0923 Red Cross arrive - EMS notified by County Comm - assign 13 patients to van
0924 fire contained - inform press - 2 vans arrive
0926 firefighters in bus - separate minor injured - traffic plan set up
0930 enter bus front and cut bus seat
093
1
organize area - move serious injuries to ambulance area
0933 stretchers taken to treatment area
0934 ambulance route established
0936 back boards on scene
0939 helo request landing instructions - initial triage complete - lay out tarps
0940 treatment area established - everyone out of bus except dead - short of personnel
0945 area contained - re-triage established - going in van sun roof
0947 1 st victim removed from van
0946 EMS arrives - Multi-casualty trailer arrives from airport
095 extrication complete
0952 helo lands
0959 1st ambulance departs
1002 1st patient arrives at CHOMP - police corns bad
1004 both vans filled with patients
1007 food passed out to rescuers - report 34 transported, 13 immediate on site
1012 helo lands at Watsonville
1014 morgue established
1016 request additional medical resources
1020 send personnel for rehabilitation
1022 minor treatment van departs
1025 coroner arrives
1026 rehabilitation established
1040 helo needs fuel due to long hovering time
1044 no more ambulances available report
1052 take dead to morgue
1104 helo departs
1116 all deceased out of bus




A post event meeting was held on December 9, 1998 to discuss some immediate
lessons learned. At this meeting most of the emergency response agencies were
represented and summary reports were presented to the other participants. A useful
consequence of this meeting was to enable participants, who did not visually observe the
other participants, to understand and appreciate the activities of those who relied upon them
for communication, preparation and follow-through. For example, because of the physical
isolation of the County Communication Center from the incident scene, without the post
event meeting, there can result a lack of appreciation of the constraints imposed on unseen
participants.
A questionnaire was sent to all participants to obtain feedback concerning the MCI
drill. Participant responses are presented in Appendix 6.
It is the intent of this report to provide qualitative and quantitative documentation of
the 22 November Pacific Grove Multi-Casualty Incident. We hope this information will be
used to understand and improve coordination of the activities of the many participants in
forthcoming drills and real incidents.t
IV. 1 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
The general consensus among the participants was that the MCI drill was an
educational and necessary exercise. The exercise was large enough to strain the capacity of
many of the participating organizations and required the coordination of many agencies.
There were some realities which have been learned and need to be anticipated and corrected
in future events. Many of these are listed in the observations catalogued in Appendix 6,
Participant Comments.
The use of moulage and behavior by the victims created a realistic scene at the site.
The incident was not pre-scripted in order that unanticipated events would arise and lessons
could be learned from the exercise. Lessons which can be immediately extracted and which
can be incorporated into future MCI response drills include:
• The importance of traffic control for smooth entrance and exit of medical emergency
response vehicles.
• The need to establish a landing zone for the medical evacuation helicopter before it
arrives.
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• The need for supervisors to wear identifying vests so that participants can identify those
persons with supervisory responsibility and to assist the data collectors.
• The need to set up triage areas sufficiently distanced from the accident.
• Some data takers need to be placed to provide functional area coverage in addition to
coverage of individual persons. Data collectors at non on-scene locations such as at
ambulance dispatchers and County Communication would help to understand the
sequence of events at those support agencies.
• Volunteers from agencies not normally on-scene can be used as "victims" or data
collectors so that they might observe first hand the activities of agencies they are
supporting. For example, hospital and County Communications employees many
times feel frustration because they feel like they are speaking to non-responsive
participants. Observation of on-scene activities should lead to mutual appreciation of
the roles of all agencies.
• The time between the arrival of ambulances and departure with patients was too long.
The reason for this needs to be understood.
• Times and vehicle numbers recorded by the data collectors and other agencies were not
always in agreement. It appears this is a discrepancy that goes beyond simple clock
synchronization and needs to be understood.
• Delineation of supervisory responsibility and on-scene action needs to be differentiated.
Sometimes the supervisor, e.g. incident commander and medical branch director,
became too closely engaged in the physical activities of their subordinates that the
overall coordination suffered. The desire to "do something" is a natural human
tendency, but it is important to emphasize that the requirements for overall coordination
sometimes supersedes involvement in a singular action.
• Initially, the incident commander was much too busy because subordinate positions
were not assigned.
• A point of consideration and discussion prior to another drill is whether the number of
rescuers was sufficient for an incident of this size.
Although many of these aspects had been anticipated in principle, the drill
emphasized that geography and specifics of a particular drill magnify operational
difficulties. With live drills, we are able to gain experience to adjust to realities.
It is important to recognize that this was the largest exercise conducted at the local
level. The involvement of 170 participants is an accomplishment in itself. Experience is a
8.
great teacher. Observing and learning from the glitches during this exercise will help create
a more smoothly running operation during the next exercise and, if need be, in the event of
an actuality.
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The Pacific Grove Fire Department has participated each year since 1990 in
the City of Pacific Grove's annual functional earthquake exercise. The City
participates in the State of California's earthquake exercise scheduled for
the first Tuesday in April each year. These functional exercises primarily
focus on activation of the City's emergency operations center.
Recently, the Pacific Grove Fire Department has conducted several full-
scale multi-casualty incident exercises with a small number of victims.
This full-scale drill was designed to provide realistic training in multi-
casualty incident exercise with a larger number of victims.
Goal
The goal of this exercise is to provide training for mass casualty response
situations, and to practice the coordination among multiple agencies and
their respective emergency management organizations specified in the
Monterey County Multi-Casualty Incident Plan (MCI Plan).
II. CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND OBJECTIVES
Concept
This will be a full-scale real-time exercise. The scenario is a multiple
vehicle accident and fire involving an 85 passenger bus, a van, and a
sedan. At least 65 injured victims need to be rescued with major
extrication problems, triaged and transported to hospitals in two counties
by ambulances and medical helicopters.
The Incident Command System (ICS), the Monterey County Multi-Casualty
Incident Plan (MCI Plan), and the City of Pacific Grove's Standardized
Emergency Management System (SEMS) Multihazard Functional Plan will
be used in the response to a multi-casualty accident. SEMS requires the use
of ICS for incident management at the SEMS Field Response level.
Purpose
The purpose of this exercise is to provide realistic training involving
multiple casualties to enhance emergenc> management readiness of the
Pacific Grove Fire, Police, and Public Works Departments, participating
mutual-aid fire departments, hospitals, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
A-l-4,
Agency, medical transport personnel of American Medical Response and
Cal-Star, and disaster volunteers of the American Red Cross, and Salvation
Army. The Naval Postgraduate School will have an opportunity to collect
data for research purposes.
Objectives
1. To test Monterey County response capabilities to a mass casuality
accident in Pacific Grove.
2. To practice with and evaluate the Monterey County Multi-Casualty
Incident Plan.
3. To practice with and evaluate the Incident Command System (SEMS
Field Response Level).
4. To provide hands-on training in a real-life emergency environment
with a large number of injured victims.
5. To collect and evaluate critical emergency response data as a part of a
research project to develop computer models of mass casualty incidents.
III. ARTIFICIALITIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
Artificialities
1. Victim injuries will be moulaged or simulated.
2. Exercise communications will be identified as "exercise".
3. Some medical transport may be made by van, simulating an ambulance
4. The vehicles involved in the accident will be pre-staged in place.
Assumptions
1. Exercise weather is actual weather.
2.. Exercise time is real time.
3.. Normal EMS/Hospital staffing.
4. Pacific Grove Fire, Police, and Public Works Departments will have
normal Saturday staffing and equipment levels.
IV. EXERCISE PARTICIPATION
Pacific Grove Fire Department
Pacific Grove Police Department















Office of Emergency Services
Emergency Medical Services Agency
Cal-Star Air Ambulance
American Medical Response




Santa Cruz County Chapter
Salvation Army
Hospitals:
Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (CHOMP)
Natividad Hospital
Watsonville Community Hospital





P.G. Fire Dept. MCI Exercise Planning Team
(Representatives from organizations listed above)
V. REFERENCES
1. Monterey County Multi-Casualty Incident Plan (Sept. 1,1 993)
2. Pacific Grove SEMS Multihazard Functional Plan (Nov.27,1996)
3. Incident Command System (SEMS Field Response Level)
VI. EXERCISE CONTROL
The Exercise Director will control the exercise. He will also supervise safety
and security concerns for the exercise.
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VII. EVALUATION AND DATA COLLECTION
The Exercise Director will invite all participating organizations to a
debriefing, post-exercise review, and evaluation workshop after the
exercise. The purpose of this meeting will be to review the exercise and
collect suggestions and recommentations of lessons learned from
participants.
A data collection team will be present during the drill to observe the
exercise and collect data on a not-to-interfere basis. This special data
collection is in addition to information normally recorded by operational
personnel in carrying out their responsibilities, such as ICS Form 214 Unit
Log. A copy of the usual operational records will be made available to the
data collection team after the exercise to be used in preparation of their
data report for the Exercise Director. The data collection effort will also be
used by researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School in development of
computer models of mass casualty incidents.
VIII. COMMUNICATIONS
Communications will be as specified in the Monterey County Multi-casualty
Incident Plan.
IX. SAFETY AND SECURITY
This exercise will involve more than 170 victims, emergency
responders, and support personnel. There will also be newspaper and
TV station reporters and photographers, data collectors, and official
visitors such as Pacific Grove City Council members. Safety should be
a
%
matter of concern for all participants.




An exercise after-action report will be prepared and distributed to
participants.
XL PUBLIC INFORMATION
Public information will be provided to appropriate media representatives.
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The media, the public, and Monterey Communications Center, and
Montyerey County Office of Emergency Services have been advised of thre
exercise.
XII. INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS
1. Questions should be discussed with the Exercise Director.
2. Actions should be consistent with the Monterey County Multi-Casualty
Incident Plan.
3. Save and forward all documentation and exercise records to the
Exercise Director who will make them available to the Data Collection
Team.
4. Be prepared to discuss briefly your comments and lessons-learned at a
workshop after the exercise.
5. Complete the Exercise Critique form and forward it to the Exercise
Director after the exercise.
XIII. SCHEDULE FOR MCI EXERCISE ON NOVEMBER 22, 1997
0600 Victims report to Pacific Grove Fire Department for moulage
Data Collectors report to Pacific Grove Police Department
(Conference Room) for instruction in data collection
0700 Ocean View Boulevard blocked and security posted
0730 Doc's Towing brings bus, van, and car to accident scene
0830 Victims are placed at accident scene
Data collectors on scene
0900 Exercise begins.
1200 Exercise finishes (estimated)
Data collectors report back to Police Department to turn in data
sheets and review data collection
1400 End of data review (estimated)
XIV. DISTRIBUTION
Participants - one copy for each organization
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EXERCISE PLAN ANNEXES
ANNEX A: PLANNING MILESTONES
15 Oct 1997 1030 MCI exercise planning meeting at
Pacific Grove Fire Department
4 Novl997 1030 MCI exercise planning meeting at Pacific
Grove Fire Department
18 Nov1997 1030 MCI exercise planning meeting at Pacific
Grove Fire Department
22 Nov 1997 Conduct Exercise
ANNEX B: SCENARIO
The scenario is a multiple vehicle accident and fire involving an 85
passenger bus, a van, and a sedan. At least 65 injured victims need to be
rescued with major extrication problems, triaged and transported to
hospitals in two counties by ambulances and medical helicopters. This will
be a full-scale exercise.
ANNEX C: PARTICIPANTS
Pacific Grove Fire Department
Pacific Grove Police Department















Office of Emergency Services
Emergency Medical Services Agency
Cal-Star Air Ambulance
American Medical Response




Santa Cruz County Chapter
Salvation Army
Hospitals:
Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (CHOMP)
Natividad Hospital
Watsonville Community Hospital





P.G. Fire Dept. MCI Exercise Planning Team
(Representatives from organizations listed above)
ANNEX E: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
Communications will be conducted on both handheld radios and
cellular telephones in accord with the MCI Plan
ANNEX F: MEDIA PLAN
Purpose:
The purpose of this annex is to identify steps taken to publicize this
mas casualty drill and to enhance relationships with the media.
Operation:
The Public Information Officer's function will be consistent with the
Pacific Grove SEMS Multihazard Functional Plan.
The following action steps have been taken in preparation for the





Notify appropriate agencies about exercise
Set up media and observer staging area.
Coordinate with Videographer who is preparing
the training video
Invite media to exercise briefing
Escort media to view area
Provide media with periodic exercise briefings
Escort media to photo opportunity staging area
ANNEX G: SAFETY AND SECURITY PLAN
Purpose
The purpose of this annex is to outline the measures that will be
taken to conduct a safe and secure full-scale multi-casualty exercise.
1. All participants are required to consider safety first and to
alert safety officers of safety issues. Safety officers shall have the
authority to stop the exercise.
2. Should any person involved in the conduct of the exercise
observe an unsafe condition or sustain a real injury, he/she shall
immediately notify a safety officer.
3 The word "FAILSAFE" will be the keyword to stop all exercise
activities.
4. In the event of a "real" emergency that requires the response
of any of the participants, or should injury occur, "FAJLSAEE" will
be declared and the exercise shall cease. Medical standby will be
contacted immediately.
5. All responses to the scene from staging may be CODE 3 (red
lights and sirens), with due regard for traffic. Response from
treatment area to simulated hospital will be CODE 2.
6. Emergency medical standby will be provided by one paramedic
transport unit at rehab. If that unit is called away, a participating
unit will replace it. If participating fire units called into service
FAILSAFE" will be called until situation is adjusted.a
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Appendix 2 List of Attendees at Planning Meetings















Planning meeting participants. Oct. 15. 1997
Carmel Fire
CHOMP Base Hospital Coordinator



























Planning meeting Participant . Nov. 4, 1997
Xavier Maruyama NPS 656-2431
Gordon Schacher NPS 656-1104
Jim Stubblefield, MD EMS, Mo. Co. 755-5013
Peggy Toft EMS 755-5013
Mary Foraker CALSTAR 692-9002 Pager
Bill Kennedy PGPD 648-3143/643-7764
Robert L. Verwold PGPW 648-3122
Paul Ireland OES 759-6686
Dennis Holland OES 9-1-1 647-7900
Joanne Rubin CALSTAR 692-90004
Howard Main EMS 424-1867
Lou Bollinger PGFS (videographer) 443-1103
Russell Coile PGFD 648-3110
Asst Chief Andrew Miller PGFD 648-3110/3111
Laurie Benjamin EMS 755-5013
Mary Wurth CHOMP 622-0277
Pat Wainwright NMC (Natividad) 755-4185
Byron Kitagawa NMC 755-4195
Mike Nelson AMR 883-3285
Lori White SVMH (Salinas) 755-0704
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Appendix 3 Consolidated Events Log
The exercise events are recorded in one minute increments for the two and one half
hour period from 0900 to 1 130 on 22 November 1998. Notice that even though not all the
supervisory positions listed in Appendix 4 were formally appointed, the functions of those
positions were carried out by some other participant. Thus, the absence of events recorded
in a particular column does not mean no action were being taken. The full one-minute
interval event logs are presented to give a visualization of the event sequence.
Besides the on scene participant logs according to the exercise plan as presented in
Appendix 1 , we have extracted key functional event logs for vehicles, physical
occurrences, law enforcement, site communications and victims. We separately present
event logs obtained from American Medical Response (AMR) ambulance service,
CALSTAR helicopter service and from County Communication / 91 1 . There exists general
agreement concerning times between the on scene data collector entries and logs from the
external agencies. However, details of the ambulance logs are not in conformance with that
of the on-scene data collectors.
A-3-1
Event Log Coverage
We also present a diagram of the response system site participants from the
Monterey County Multi-Casualty Incident Procedures to illustrate the relationship of these
participants to each other.
1) Incident Commander
2) Public Information Officer
3) Liaison Officer
4) Safety Officer




8) Fire Branch Director
9) Rescue
10) Medical Branch Director
11) Extrication/First Triage
12) Transportation Group Supervisor
13) Ambulance Staging
14) Air Branch Director














































Note:Direction oiambulance travel shouldhe established to ensure that th
travel to the "immediate" treatment area then the "delayed"and finally
the "minor"treatment area.
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order 4 amb & helo




reassn fire contain to triage
assn Bidder to Rescue
































Incident Commander PIO Liaison Officer Safety Officer
assn 6412 to Med Brnch
corns with morgue
send med equip to treat
6513 to extrication









6211 on other side
traffic plan established
change helo landing zone
EMS stationed
corns 1 vict left in van
60 victims reported
































Incident Commander PIO Liaison Officer Safety Officer
critical debriefing
set up eating schedule
2 new fire to Trans Group
request assist from Carmel
no staging area
people needed






prog rpt 8 moved from seen




report adequate resources check with Treat Mgr
Salinas no resonse
8 vict moved reported
assn Rec Cross Logis Chf
assn2175APIO
check bus scene
recv 14d 14i 35m report
































Incident Commander PIO | Liaison Officer Safety Officer







1 rescuer hurt back
real incident report
remove PIO vest
Miller film shoot safety meeting
Watsonville patient inquirey
ask next helo destination
helo needs 1/2 hr refueling
assn helo to Natividad
police interview
assn 3 NCFD to Medical
receive helo ETA 1054 check vehicle fluid
environmental impact
KION interview Red Cross
report to IC
Medical Branch interview get personnel records
from Treat Mgr
6513,6571 PARS
Air Ops checked in
15d, 19 i report
give news interview IC interview
28 victims on scene, 62 tot*
report
i
































Incident Commander PIO Liaison Officer Safety Officer
report 34 transported,
1 3 i on site
PG Fire interview




































































(Logistics Sect Chief Operations Officer Personnel Staging Equipment Staging
request 2nd jaws

































Logistics Sect Chief Operations Officer Personnel Staging Equipment Staging
12 more fire, on scene
1 medical for break
no stage mgr, staff short
request for straps, c-spine
gear, and collers
requ. for roller bandages,
can't get
report adequate resources
rehab area set up rolling stretcher brought out
4 fire to rest
































|l_ogistics Sect Chief Operations Officer Personnel Staging Equipment Staging
don ID vest groups of 6 to rehab
check communications
5211 call in
call Logistics for juice






get EMS vehicle report
corns Wats can take 4






65-89 fire fighters on scene ON SCENE
1 1 fire engines, IC van,
1 fire pick up, logistics van,
2 food trucks, 1 civilian car,
Safety calls for advice 6 patrol cars, 2 trucks,
EMS truck and trailer,
2 fire trucks
meet with IC
water to road block temp relief to road block


































Logistics Sect Chief Operations Officer Personnel Staging Equipment Staging
5.7 gal gas. 2 qts trans
fluid to Red Cross
10-15 at Red Cross
IC coffee break
confer w Med Brnch
morgue wants bus moved
briefing on moving bus
check injured
request food for flight crew slow down ambul returns
confer at rehab
751 1 completes rehab
report to IC
flight crew gets food pack up litter boards




































Fire Branch Director Rescue Medical Branch Director Extrication/First Triage
check communications don ID vest start serious triage
review assignments
direct extrication start
treat who can reach
move and tag dead
determine #53 & #54 dead
ext 2 bus back door
3 more out bus back door
2imm 2dec 2 del extr
assign physical ops and
extr groups




3 rescuers in bus to help
1 imm out
minor injuries separated
































Fire Branch Director Rescue Medical Branch Director Extrication/First Triage
assign litter bearers enter bus front
cut front seat
move victims
assess bus front vict 3 imm out bus front organize area
move serious to amb area
address treatment group #23 out of bus immediates on boards
first back boards on scene
decide cut front of bus
coordinate with Transport
Group Supervisor
cover victims with blankets
ran out of tags
lay out tarps
short of personnel
cut bus bars with jaws neck wounded on boards
lay out tarps 1 out on back board
look for immediate victims
work both ends of bus move victims to tarps
going in van sun roof still extricating
EMT crew retriaging
tend to immediates
1 st victm from van
1 out on back board
leave 3 dead on bus
extrication complete
vict lying by van tape area
neck brace on 2 imm
for helo
victims to helo c-spine and back boards
ordered
































Fire Branch Director Rescue Medical Branch Director Extrication/First Triage
9 deceased




ask if TGS needs personne
requ equip and personnel
inventory from groups
plan 6 by air
14 deceased requ tgs come to medical
order more supplies
notify extric of equip needs walking wounded to van
send people to rehab
8 patients moved
1 5 ready for Watsonville

































Fire Branch Director Rescue Medical Branch Director Extrication/First Triage
don ID vest head count, ask if
resources needed
requ 2 more engine
companies
rescuer strains back
2 patients to CHOMP




count 14 sent, 14 min rem
ask to take deceased
out of bus









































Fire Branch Director Rescue Medical Branch Director Extrication/First Triage
1st deceased from bus speak to patients
load patients on helo
count 13 remaining
1 5 deceased
check reuse of resources
2 to Natividad
all deceased out of bus
10 victims remain
release some fire fighters
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EXERCISE DATA LOG Pacific Grove MCI - 1 1/22/97 (pgdata4)
















915 don ID vest





921 estab corns with MICN
corns for 2 vans to Wats
922 report 40 victims
923 insure transportation
sufficient
924 2 vans arrive get ETA for helo
estab pick up point
925 verify communications estab radio channel
926 Medical Branch briefing
927










stretchers to treat area
934 set up ambulance route
935 2 boards from CCT-3
AMR assigned Amb Stage
936
937 move, area too congested 2 boards from 844
oxygen from 844
938 estab treat area
assign paramedics
939





944 log triage tags 5th ambulance arrives
945 assign re-triage
946
947 ready for transport
948 com sites to Med Brnch Dir
949
950 assure prioritization
advise Trans Grp Supv
951 insure transport capability Trans Grp Supv briefing
952 stretcher from 846 assign 2 patients to helo
953 confusion on destinations
954 report 26 immediate triage 2 helo victims
955 2 loaded for CHOMP
estab corns with Fire &TGS




958 move ambul to immediate
959 coordinate with hospital stretcher from CCT-3
CCT-3 to Natividad




































both vans (15) filled
1 patient into 829
Med Group briefing




836, 840, 828, 82?, 841
available
will have 5 ambul max
adv Med Brnch Supv of
add resource needs
Med Brnch Supv Confer
CCCT-3 leave for Wats
White van leave for Wats
8 moved out, 15 ready call for rehab personnel




































Transport Group Supv Ambul Staging Air Branch Director Treatment Group Supv
843 to CHOMP
triage tag problem
request helo to Natividad
Natividad full
request 1 imm to CHOMP 846 to CHOMP
12 have been transported
2 to Natividad by helo





mother & baby in
844 to CHOMP
take dead to morgue
helo lands
































Transport Group Supv Ambul Staging Air Branch Director Treatment Group Supv
16 transported assess patients for flight
load patient
waiting for ambulance load patient
1 1 dead in morgue
helo departs
1 1 remain for hospital
delay in patient movement
amb 846 arrives
2 by ambulance to CHOMP
843 to CHOMP
2 by amb to CHOMP
demobilize 846 to CHOMP
exercise ends
A-3-23































Re-Triage Immediate Treatment Delayed Treatment Minor Treatment
move walking victims
assign victims to areas
remove victims
treat victims arm
Treatment Group set up
remove T#637
ID 5 as delayed
talk with distressed victims
assign 1 3 to van






































Re-Triage Immediate Treatment Delayed Treatment Minor Treatment
insure tags correct
move immediate to triage
establish victim needs
and priorities
ID 2 as delayed
inform TGS of sport needs
everyone out?
direct to treatment areas








Re-Triage Immediate Treatment Delayed Treatment Minor Treatment












1010 walking delayed to van
1011


















































































Vehicle Events Physical Occurrences Law Enforcement Victim Events CHOMP MICN
MCI Alert
40 + ? victims
provide assistance to
safety officer
PG Police Arrive provide assistance for
victim control
begin triage police begin triage
Amb An- #834- (843)
2nd Police Arr
MCI activation
PG Fire 6571 Truck Arr Pol move min inj to side
17 out
2nd PG Fire Arr Bus Driver Arrested
determine if crime scene CHOMP notified to be
base hospital
remove walking
move and tag dead
notify Natividad
2 extr bus back door notify SVMH
3rd PG fire arr
arrest woman driver notify Watsonville
2-3 Crit ER, 4 ICU 2 OR
crews, 1 0-2C gen dva 1 !
3 out bus back door NMC15ER, C ~'J vtnh OR
15-20 gen @1C ' >i
begin on fire tagging dead Wats 6 ER, ICU do*
1 OR, ukn gen avail
2 imm 2 dec 2 del out
red cross arr 2 del out of bus
2 vans arrive fire contained 1 imm out
2nd ambulance arr

































Vehicle Events Physical Occurrences Law Enforcement Victim Events CHOMP MICN
set up traffic control
check coroner call
20 in bus, 20 sitting
3-4 dead
3 imm out bus front
bring out back boards operate morgue
do body count
chalk marking
# 23 out of bus
immediates on boards
1st back boards on scene
helo arrives
cover victims with blankets
triage complete
preserve evidence
neck wounded on boards
1 out of bus on back board
move victims around
4 victims on tarp
5th ambulance arrives move victims to tarps
going in van sun roof
area contained reported
area contained still extricating
6 victims immediate tarp
EMS arr south side
MC trailer arr
more medical support arr 1st victim from van
13 victims on immed tarp
med equip to treatment
measure area
area secured
1 out on back board
leave 3 dec on bus
extrication complete
helo landed
2 trucks & bronco arr helo stretcher unloaded Corns 60+ vict, 25 crit, 20
walk, 2 still trapped
two fire eng around back neck brace on 2 immediate
for helo
question drunk 1 ambulance loaded
25 critical, 2 trapped in bus
Corns CHOMP ETA 10-15
min with 2 imm
1st victim to helo
2nd victim to helo
B271605 to CHOMP
amb ready for Natividad
call for Monterey status
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Vehicle Events Physical Occurrences Law Enforcement Victim Events CHOMP MICN
1000 9 deceased
1001
1002 communications bad covering bodies 095669 & 095666 arrive
1003
1004
1005 not enough blankets to
cover dead use sheets
patient into 829
1006 ambulance to Natividad Corns CHOMP ETA 5-10
NMC ETA 25-30
1007 food to rescuers 2nd patient into 829
1008
1009 patients loaded




1014 morgue established request radios 14 deceased
1015
1016




1020 walking wounded to van
CCCT-3 leave for Wats
1021
1022 minor treat van departs 8 moved out, 1 5 ready
1023 Corns WCH ETA 1025
still loading 14 by van
1024 15 walking ready for Wats 27685 & 095679 arrive
1025 coroner arrives coroner arrives
1026 rehab established Corns NMC ETA helo unk
Corns van leaving for WCH
1027
1028 direct ambulances
































Vehicle Events Physical Occurrences Law Enforcement Victim Events CHOMP MICN




Corns CHOMP ETA 10-15
2 patient to CHOMP
12 have been transported
dec from van baby only
2 more to CHOMP in 846
van driver arrested 095638 & 095682 arrive
1st deceased examined
2 to Natividad by helo
2 more to Natividad




count 14 sent, 14 min remain
19 remain for care
60 patients cared for
woman & dead baby to CHOM D
2 patients to CHOMP
destination confusion
move patients closer to helo
095696 & 095700 arrive
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Vehicle Events Physical Occurrences Law Enforcement Victim Events CHOMP MICN
1100 1st deceased from bus
1101
1102 load patients on helo
1103
1104 helo takes off
1105 2 loaded on helo
count 13 victims remain
1106
1107 1 5 deceased Corns 2 to CHOMP
1108
1109 clean up trash
1110 instruct on evidence
under vehicle




1114 Corns CHOMP ETA 10-15
Corns requ on scene info
1115 2 in 843 to CHOMP Corns requ no more xport
1116 all deceased out of bus
1117 10 victims remain
1118
1119
1120 2 in 846 to CHOMP
1121
1122 fastest ambulance turn
around 40 min
095646 & 666131 arrive
1123
1124 666126 & 095647 arrive







EXERCISE DATA LOG Pacific Grove MCI - 1 1/22/97 (pgdata8)
AMR Logs Site Communications Helicopter Logs County Communications
900









909 #836 dispatched call MCI
910 additional responders need
911 #836 at site location ID
912 CHP advised
913
914 #840 dispatched MCI trailer needed
form fire strike team
915 #829 dispatched PM notified MCI
570 pol request MCI
916 communications check T6571 on scene
917 advise Santa Cruz of MCi
call CV amb, no response
918
919 CHP on scene, DUI, notify
CHOMP MCI, call MC/EMS
920 E6412, E0612 en route
E6513 on scene
921 Trans Grp establish
MICN communications
orange frequency assigned
922 CH 6406 back
923 #828 dispatched EMS notified
Harry advised
924 press and TV notified page MRY airport for trailer
925 Air Branch establish
radio channel
call for 2 off duty police
for morgue
926 #840 at site CALSTAR advised
and en route
927 IC to Triage MCI activation from
County Corns
928 #829 at site
929 request contact coroner
A-3-33
AMR Logs Site Communications Helicopter Logs County Communications
IC cell phone to dispatch
to confirm resources
IC-Treat Grp add resources CALSTAR ETA + 5 min
use tactical Silver
lift off from MRY advise Coast Guard of drill
Navy fire advised
Airport to IC, helo on way
#828 at site IC helo 3 min out arrive accident scene
no landing zone
helo requests land zone
Treat Grp establish corns
with treatment mngrs





police ask if PIO established
land at incident site
commun land zone
with hospital
CHP can't com with
PG on portable




































AMR Logs Site Communications Helicopter Logs County Communications
#828 depart with 2 take off for Watsonville
police corns bad
victim count report
9 dec 14imm 35 del/mm
Coroner on way
request Carmel assistance 1 4 dead confirmed
Cnml can't provide type 1 land at Watsonville
Med Brnch requ Trans
Grp presence
#840 depart wwith 2 Amb Stag report
5 ambulance max
CH6500 dead confirmation
#829 depart with 2 police request radios coroner updated
no corns vans to hospital
#828 arrive CHOMP equipment transport
to Trans Grp
Spreckles refuses








report to Med Brnch
resources OK
lift off from Watsonville
helo requests next destin

































AMR Logs Site Communications Helicopter Logs County Communications
#840 arrive site Med Brnch requests
2 more engine companies
Highlands declines
Wats reports full
STAR 1 to where?
#836 depart with 2 corns with STAR 1
Trans Grp, Natividad full
police 871 en route
real incident reported
EMS vehicle report
land at MRY for fuel due to
long hover time at site
Wats says can take 4 more
Watsonville inquires about
number of patients
$840 depart with 2
CH 6500 wants STAR
return to land zone
helo reports need of
1/2 hour for refuel
MRY reports STAR
refueling
helo reports ETA 1 054
Safety calls Ops Officer
for advice
lift off MRY airport
A-3-36,
AMR Logs Site Communications Helicopter Logs 1 County Communications





corns brief by airport
general manager
#840 at site
all hospitals report full








































EMS 870 in service
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Appendix 4 Data Collectors and Participants Coverage
The lack of participant names does not necessarily imply that the function was not
fulfilled by an unnamed participant or by some other person or persons who may have had
multiple responsibilities. The dynamic nature of the MCI response appeared evident in the
data collection and revealed the need for functional coverage by the data collectors in















5 Logistics Section Chief
6. Operations Section Chief
7 Personnel Staging Manager
8. Equipment Staging Manager
9. Fire Branch Director
10. Physical Extrication/Rescue Branch Cpt. Napier
1 1
.
Medical Branch Director David Brown, PGFD
12. Extrication/Triage Grp. Sup.
& First Triage
13. Transportation Grp. Sup. Greg Dukart, AMR
14. Ambulance Staging Manager
15. Air Branch Director Steve Prelsnik, SFD
16. Treatment Group Sup.
1 7 Re-Triage/Litter Bearing
1 8 Immediate Treatment Group
1 9 Delayed Treatment Group
20. Minor Treatment Group
2 1
.
Law Enforcement Br. Dir. Tom Uretsky, PGFD
& Activities
22. Public Works Activities
23. Hospital Arrival (CHOMP) MaryWurth
24. Hosp. Arrival (Watsonville)





























Appendix 5 Data Collector Packets
Each data collector listed in Appendix 4 was given the listing of data collection
structure which shows the 30 activities monitored, the ICS overview chart, and the Multi-
Casualty Incident Site Plan diagram.
The data log pages are based on ICS 214 Unit Logs containing a duty list
appropriate for each unit supervisor. Data log pages for most of the positions were
effectively identical to those presented here for the incident commander. Note that the logs
consist of a Duty Checklist and a narrative log where the data collector enters events they
observe. The Immediate Treatment log included has the same format as the Incident
Commander's, but the narrative log has prompts of the types of events, and associated
information, that are to be recorded. These two logs are representative of the 30 used.
The data collectors wrote in their observations and times in both the events checklist




Modified ICS 214 Unit Logs
Created for NPS Multi-Casualty Incident Data Logging
1) Incident Commander
2) Public Information Officer
3) Liaison Officer
4) Safety Officer




8) Fire Branch Director
9) Rescue
10) Medical Branch Director
11) Extrication/First Triage
12) Transportation Group Supervisor
13) Ambulance Staging
14) Air Branch Director
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Air Branch
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Mote: Direction of3mtutsnet travelshouldbe established to ensure that ih
travel to the "immediate"treatment area then the "delayed"and finally
the "minor"treatment area.
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INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC) - DUTY CHECKLIST
Radio Call "Incident Commander"
Name PG Fire Dept Exercise 1 1/22/97 Data Collector
The Incident Commander is responsible for incident activities including the development and
implementation of strategic decisions and for approving the ordering and releasing of resources.
Assess incident situation Time
Initiate MCI alert
Don ID Vest
Establish and check communications











Approve and authorize implementation of Incident Action Plan
Establish common communications
Designate a centralized treatment area
Designate staging areas
Designate traffic plan
Designate a medical equipment strip/supply area
Determine information needs and inform command personnel of needs
A-5-5.

INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC) - DUTY CHECKLIST Page-2
Request additional resources as needed
Authorize information release to news media
Receive situation updates




INCIDENT COMMANDER PG I 1/22 ICS 2I4(N) I NI I" LOG




IMMEDIATE TREATMENT - DUTY CHECKLIST
Radio Call "Immediate"
Name PG Fire Dept Exercise 1 1/22/97 Data Collector
The Immediate Treatment Unit Leader reports to the Treatment Group Supervisor. The Unit is
responsible for on-site medical treatment for victims requiring immediate care due to their
condition being near-term life threatening.
Obtain briefing from the Treatment Group Supervisor to determine Time
the expected number of victims to be treated
Request the needed numbers of medical personnel for the Treatment Area
Request the needed supplies and equipment for the Treatment Area
Establish victim needs and treat on a priority basis
.
Inform the Treatment Group Supervisor of victim status, and priorities
for transport to medical care facilities
Prepare victims for transport
Request treatment personnel, personnel rotation, and supplies
replacement as needed
Maintain treatment records and deliver to the Treatment Group
Supervisor when the last on-site patient has been transported
Maintain Unit Log (ICS Form 2 1 4)
A-5-8.

IMMEDIATE TREATMENT PG 11/22 ICS2!4fN) I IN IT LOG
Logger Name_
TIME TREATMENT EVENT ARRIVAL AMBUL ID TRIAGES
A-5-9.

Appendix 6 Participant Comments
In order to insure that we obtained candid participant responses, we have edited and
made anonymous the participant responses. The commentary are to be regarded as
constructive criticism. In discussing the events with each participant, every group felt that
the exercise was conducted professionally and efficiently. Drills such as this are necessary
in order to insure appropriate MCI response. The minimal pre-scripting was designed so
that the response was as close to reality as could be and realistic lessons could be learned.
This MCI drill was not intended to be test for grading purposes, but as a training and
education effort.
The participant responses are presented. In some instances there may be rationale
for some of the observations listed under the question "What went wrong?", however the
criticisms need to be accepted as points for consideration. Not all the responses were made
by personnel fully trained in emergency response. There are instances in which particular
individual participants did not receive communications, but others did. Not all
observations apply universally. In keeping with the spirit that unanticipated observations
can be obtained from eyes not accustomed to a particular mode of behavior, we present
these participant comments.
A 6.1 What Went Well?
1. Community Hospital reported that there was an excellent response to the call-in of
emergency department staff both in terms of number of nurses and timely arrival within 30
minutes and the number of doctors available and participating
2
. The exercise was valuable because of the number of hospital staff who participated




There was a smooth flow of patients within the hospital system
4. One fire department commented: First of all the drill was very well coordinated, the
patients and scene appeared real and provided a life-like scenario. The magnitude of the




Good realism about the scene
6. Congratulations on a very successful MCI drill. It was very clear that a great deal of
preparation took place to ensure a productive learning experience for all involved.
7 . The MCI vests played an important role in making identification easy.




1 Community Hospital did not hear any formal announcement from the scene that a
multi-casualty incident had been activated.
2
. There were delays in transport of victims. The first victim arrived at Community
Hospital more than an hour after the drill started. Many victims were still on the scene
awaiting transport after 2 1/2 hours.
3
.
The sudden refusal of one of the hospitals to participate as planned.
4. There were too many firefighters standing around in the triage area not being used.
5 There were unattended victims everywhere - especially in the "immediate" area and
ambulances.
6. Rehab for firefighter and ambulance crews was established too late.
7 There were too many victims in the exercise with too many critical injuries.
8 There was confusion in the Treatment area because the patient treatment areas were
not marked "immediate", delayed", "minor".
9. Some patients were dropped because they were not strapped to backboards.




The Medical Treatment Supervisor was overwhelmed with a rush of engine
companies and strike teams assisting with treatment. Also, there were too many individuals
communicating with the Medical Treatment Supervisor.
12. There was no briefing of incoming personnel. I was assigned to a position without
knowledge of the scene and positions assigned. I did not fully understand the objectives.
Luckily I brought my own clipboard and checklist.
13. There was no staging prior to our entry into the scene. There were no T-cards being
turned in, it was difficult to figure out the scene and ICS structure.
14. It was nearly one hour into the drill before the treatment areas were clearly
established. This delay caused more personnel to be used in providing limited patient care.
15. Scene and site walk through not done by first Paramedic on scene to fully assess the
number of patients and location.
1 6. The area was not secured early.
1 7
.
The patients were not moved from danger to safe treatment areas.
18. Pediatric patients were assessed/triaged very late - potential loss of life here.
19. Landing zone not established until almost one hour into exercise.
20. Police arrested both drivers of bus and van - are they in need of medical care? Yes.
Shouldn't Police do more important things such as safety and evaluation of scene - not
arresting drivers.
2 1 Walking wounded returned to the accident scene and confused the overall picture.
(editorial comment: This comment illustrates what may happen in a very realistic event.
Walking wounded are going to do just as commented here unless they are monitored,
supervised or directed.)
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22. Medical Branch Director got too involved with patient care.
23. Triage was done too close to accident scene.
24. Treatment area was too close to accident scene.
25. After "immediates" were moved into triage area, no one attended to them.
26. The morgue was set up very late.
27
.
The helicopter landing zone was established too close to the Incident Command
post.
28. Triage should be done further from the scene.







Community Hospital commented that the communications from the scene was
minimal with NONE during the first hour of the exercise. This is a critical period from the
hospital coordinator's perspective since she needs to know how many victims there are at
the incident and the nature of the injuries.
2. The use of MedNet 2 for Group Transportation Supervisor with Coordinating Base
Hospital worked well.




From what I was able to gather, it appears that the radio communications were
appropriate except for some obvious delays with County Comms dispatching other
agencies. I heard that Salinas Rural Fire Dept. stated that they heard the request for




Comments on Command and Control
1
.
Excellent within Community Hospital - much improved from past drills.
2. Incident Command System positions were slow in being established. Operations
Section Chief was not established until 1030, late into the exercise.
3 There was no briefing of incoming personnel. I was assigned to a position without
knowledge of the scene and positions assigned. I did not fully understand the objectives.
Luckily I brought my own clipboard and checklist.
4. The California Highway Patrol Officer, showed up, did his investigation, then left.
Normally, as senior investigating officer he should have reported to the incident command
and formed a unified command.
5
.
There was confusion as to who should talk to the helicopter - Air Operations or
Transport Group Supervisor.
6. There was a delay in establishing the staging manager which had the result that there
were a lot of people standing around after their assignment, such as extrication, was
completed, because they didn't have anyone to report to for new reassignment.
A 6.
5
Comments on Physical Processes and Procedures
1 Moulage and victim participation were excellent.
2 The exercise was a good opportunity for testing the Hospital Emergency Incident
Command System (HEICS) as recommended by SEMS.
3. The vans that were used to transport victims with minor injuries never reported to
staging for check-in.
4. Dead bodies were being pulled out of the vehicles and left on the side of the road
without being carried to a designated temporary morgue, preferably away from the walking
A-6-5.




Paramedic reports on incoming hospital victims were too long and too detailed.
6. First-in police officers started triage right away (by directing all people who were not
hurt to crawl out of the overturned bus), however there was no designated area for the
walking-wounded to go to other than wandering around the wrecked vehicles.
A 6.
6
Value of the exercise to you and/or your organization
1 Community Hospital used the exercise to train many additional personnel in various
in-house disaster roles - from administrative to supplies.
2 The exercise was of very high value to our participating fire engine crew and myself.
3 Major value - we can never have too many drills for practice and education.
A 6.
7
What to do differently the next exercise?
1
.
Do a table-top exercise prior to an actual exercise to go over exactly what's going to
happen and get appropriate responses from all the key players. Then review procedures,
etc. Make the exercise a real learning/education project rather than a "surprise".
2. Limit the transported victims to 10-20; limit the critical injuries to 5-7. Do not
actually transport victims to hospitals with long transit times which will have long turn-
around times, ("paper" patients work just fine).
3 Pay more attention to communications through County Communications..
4
.
Ensure that all incoming supervisors get an immediate briefing when they arrive
which will allow assigned ICS personnel to obtain the Multi-casuality Incident objectives,
the scene status, the locations, the personnel assigned, a clipboard with checklist and the
appropriate identification vest.
5 Ensure that all incoming units report initially to a staging area.
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6. Ensure that there is a proper demobilization.
7. The "Immediate" treatment" area and the "Delayed" treatment area should be
separated by enough space for the medical cache of supplies to be placed between them
convenient to both.
8. Incoming personnel should be assigned key responsibilities such as Operations
Chief, Medical Branch Director, Extrication/Triage, Transportation Group Supervisor,
Staging Manager, etc. as soon as they arrive. They do not have to be officers since they can
be relieved when others arrive.
9
.
Make it clear to all participants that Air Operations talks to medical helicopter.
10. Station a "data collector" at the County Comms 9-1-1 Center.
1 1
.
Establish treatment areas with appropriate signs as soon as possible to create
catchment areas for triaged victims
12. One of the first-in Ambulance personnel should become Medical Branch Director,
should don appropriate vest and meet with Incident Commander. He or she should not
touch patients and get involved with care.
13. Walking wounded should go to their appropriate area and be secured by police or
someone to prevent them from returning back into the accident scene.
14. Helicopter landing site should be far enough from the scene that the helicopter
doesn't cause problems for the treatment area or the command post.
15. All unit leaders should put on appropriate identification vests and meet with their
supervisors.
1 6. Rehab area with liquids and refreshment should be established early enough to help
the initial responders.
17. Patients should be properly strapped to backboards.
A-6-7
.
18. Patient treatment areas should be identified early using paint, tarps, barrier tape,
landmarks, etc. to avoid confusion.
19. If possible , four people should carry a patient properly strapped to a backboard.
20. Explorer scouts should be identified as explorer scouts.
21. It is recommended that the first-in fire company operate as follows: A) Captain
makes a size-up while trotting around the scene - then establishes treatment areas and
morgue area. B) Engineer secures the accident damaged vehicles - disconnects batteries,
stops fluid and gasoline leaks, stabilizes vehicles with cribbing. C) Firefighter starts triage
of victims.
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